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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dewayne Banks appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings 
The facts and course of proceedings relating to Banks' first post-
conviction action are as set forth by the district court in its order granting the 
state's motion for summary dismissal: 
On September 20, 2000, Petitioner was convicted following 
a trial by jury of the felony offense of Robbery as charged in Part I 
of the information and his guilty plea to a Persistent Violator 
sentence enhancement allegation. Petitioner filed a Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal on October 4, 2000. The Court 
subsequently denied the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on 
November 24, 2000 and on December 15, 2000 the Court 
sentenced Petitioner to a minimum period of confinement of ten 
(10) years, and a subsequent indeterminate period of confinement 
of not to exceed life, for a total unified term of life. 
The Petitioner filed a pro se notice of Appeal on January 23, 
2001. The State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was appointed 
to represent Petitioner in this appeal. 
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se Rule 35 motion seeking 
reduction of his sentence, which was subsequently denied by the 
Court on June 14, 2001. On June 26, 2001 the Petitioner filed a 
pro se Notice of Appeal on the denial of his Rule 35 Motion. The 
SAPD was appointed to represent Petitioner on his appeal from the 
Rule 35 Denial. 
On June 4, 2002 the Court of Appeals issued its 
Unpublished Opinion Number 640 (Docket Nos. 27207 & 27629) 
affirming the sentence imposed and affirming this Court's Order 
denying Petioners [sic} Rule 35 motion. A Petition for Review was 
subsequently denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals has 
now become final. 
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On September 4, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for 
Post Conviction reHef, Canyon County case number CV-2002-
08175*C. The Court entered its final Order dismissing the Petition 
on October 1, 2003. Petitioner filed an appeal and the Idaho 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on July 23, 2004, Remitittur 
[sic] filed October 21, 2004 (No. 30070). 
Thereafter, on October 26, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se 
Notice of Appeal from the Order of Dismissal. This appeal was 
dismissed by the Idaho Supreme Court on November 7, 2005, 
Remittitur filed January 3, 2006 (No. 32436). 
(R., pp.99-100.) 
Statement of Facts and Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings 
The course of events of Banks' current petition for post-conviction relief 
were outlined by the district court in its order granting the state's motion for 
summary dismissal: 
On June 18, 2009, the Petitioner, filed a pro se Petition and 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
which was assigned Case No. CV 2009-0006327*C. On June 29, 
2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for Appointment of Counsel, 
Affidavit, and Memorandum of Law in Support of Appointment of 
Counsel. 
On July 21, 2009, this Court ordered the appointment of the 
Canyon County Public Defender to represent Petitioner in this 
case. The Order appointing the Public Defender granted that office 
forty-five (45) days to investigate Petitioner's case and, if 
necessary, to file an amended petition. 
On August 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to 
Disqualify Weibe and Fouser, P.A., Canyon County Public 
Defender, Affidavit, and Memorandum in Support of Motion. On 
August 6, 2009, this Court appointed Mimura Law Offices to 
represent Petitioner. The Order appointing Mimura Law Offices 
gave that office forty-five (45) days to investigate Petitioner's case 
and, if necessary, file an amended petition. No amended petition 
has been filed. 
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On September 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to 
Disqualify the Law Firm of Mimura Law Offices, Affidavit, and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion. On September 8, 2009, this 
Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Law Firm. 
On October 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for 
Extension of Time to Amend Petition on Post-Conviction Relief 
requesting a thirty (30) day extension to file a pro se amended 
petition. Also, on October 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a prose Motion 
for Correction of Clerical Errors on Request for Discovery on Post-
Conviction Relief. Petitioner filed a Motion for Hearing on these 
motions on November 20, 2009. 
On October 26, 2009 the State filed its Objection to 
Petitioner's motion for extension of time and motion for correction 
of clerical errors on the grounds that the motions were 
impermissibly made pro se after the Court's August 6, 2009, 
appointment of counsel. 
On November 20, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for 
Hearing on Petitioner's motion for extension of time and motion for 
correction of clerical errors. 
The State filed an Answer on December 4, 2009 asserting 
the affirmative defenses of, inter alia, failure to state a claim, failure 
to raise claims on direct appeal, statute of limitations, failure to 
verify the petition, failure to support petition with admissible 
evidence, improper successive petition, and failure to allege 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding that counsel's performance was 
deficient. The State's Answer was filed together with a Motion for 
Summary Dismissal. The Motion for Summary Dismissal is brought 
on the grounds that the Petition is not verified, not timely, and 
improper successive application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. 
(R., pp.98-99.) 
The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal 
because it found Banks' petition for post-conviction relief was untimely and an 
improper successive petition. (R., pp.100-101.) The court denied Banks' 
request to alter or amend the judgment on post-conviction (R., pp.304-24) and 
entered an order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (R., p.325). 
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Banks timely appeals from the 
327-30). 
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his petition. (R., pp.325, 
ISSUE 
Banks states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. 
Bank's [sic] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a 
successive petition, and/or failed to grant Mr. Bank's [sic] Motion to 
Alter or Amend? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Banks failed to establish that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Banks Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Banks' successive petition, finding the petition 
was not timely filed because the statutory time to file had expired on August 8, 
2003 and Banks filed his prose petition for post-conviction relief almost six years 
later on June 18, 2009. (R., p.101.) The district court further found in dismissing 
Banks' petition that it was an improper successive petition for post-conviction 
relief as Banks' claims had previously been raised in his direct appeals and prior 
petition for post-conviction relief and Banks had failed to assert "a sufficient 
reason for why grounds for relief were not adequately raised in the original 
petition." (R., p.101.) On appeal, Banks claims his petition was in fact timely "in 
light of his federal habeus [sic] corpus case which he contends is a proceeding 
following an appeal as contemplated by I.C. § 19-4902(1 )" and, as such, the 
court "erred by summarily dismissing his petition as untimely." (Appellant's brief, 
p.4.) Banks also contends that he "made a substantial factual showing that his 
claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt 
and could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been raised earlier," thus 
entitling him to file a successive petition under I.C. § 19-4901. (Appellant's brief, 
p.7.) 
Banks' arguments are without merit. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate 
court will review the entire record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. kl 
C. Dismissal Of Banks' Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Was 
Appropriate Because It Was Untimely Filed And Banks Failed To Allege 
Facts That, If True, Would Overcome The Successive Petition Bar And 
Entitle Him To Post-Conviction Relief 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. kl (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary an application 
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has no genuine 
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
applicant to the requested relief. Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 
P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a district court 
may dismiss a post-conviction application on the motion of any party when it 
appears that the applicant is not entitled to relief. Specifically, LC. § 19-4906(c) 
provides: 
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary 
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily 
dismissed Banks' petition as being untimely and improperly successive. 
Contrary to Banks' assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the 
applicable law supports the district court's order of summary dismissal. 
1. Banks' Successive Petition Was Untimely 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." In the 
case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid 
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims 
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which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise 
important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 220 P.3d 
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 
870, 874 (2007)). In those circumstances, the court will apply a "reasonable 
time" standard. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. "In determining 
what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply 
consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases." 
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. However, absent a showing 
by the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the failure to file a 
timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition. 
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 247,220 P.3d at 1066. 
All the claims in Banks' successive petition, filed June 18, 2009, were filed 
beyond one year after the issuance of the Remittitur in Banks' direct appeal filed 
in August of 2002. Banks does not argue that his claims were not known to him 
or could not reasonably have been known to him in the requisite time-frame for 
filing his initial post-conviction petition. Instead, Banks asserts "the habeas 
corpus proceedings that ended on April 20, 2009 with the final denial of his writ 
for certiorari constituted a proceeding following an appeal under I.C. § 19-4902, 
which would then make his June 18, 2009 application for post-conviction relief 
timely filed" under I.C. § 19-4902. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Although Banks' 
direct appeals were exhausted upon the Court of Appeals' affirming of the 
sentence imposed and decision denying his Rule 35 motion and the subsequent 
denial of a petition for review (R., p.100), Banks contends the filing of his 
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successive pro se petition for post-conviction relief some six years later was 
timely because of the previous stay of his habeas proceedings. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.4-6.) 
Banks' argument is unsupported by cited precedent and is contrary to law. 
The statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction petition begins to run "from 
the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal." I.C. § 19-4902. '"[A] 
proceeding following an appeal . . . does not encompass a separately filed 
proceeding under the UPCPA or one for relief such as by way of a writ of habeas 
corpus, subsequent to the judgment of conviction." Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 
627, 629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ct. App. 1992). Because Banks failed to file his 
successive petition within one year of the final determination of his direct appeal, 
he has failed to show that the district court erred in dismissing his successive 
petition as untimely. 
2. Banks' Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Was An Improper 
Successive Petition 
Banks' petition was also correctly dismissed on the basis that it failed to 
satisfy the criteria for a permissible successive petition under the UPCPA. Idaho 
Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of successive petitions and provides: 
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief 
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his 
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally 
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction 
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to 
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, 
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for 
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sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in 
the original, supplemental, or amended application. 
I.C. § 19-4908. In interpreting this statute, Idaho's appellate courts have held 
that "[i]neffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide 
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations 
inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent post-
conviction application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 
403 (Ct. App. 2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 
596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981 ); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 
P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999)). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 
however, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both that (a) his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(b) the.re is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88 (1984). Although Banks argues otherwise, a review of the record 
shows that Banks did not make even a prima facie showing of ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel to establish a "sufficient reason" to justify 
the filing of his successive petition in this case. 
Banks' pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief alleged 
numerous claims of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, but Banks did not assert 
he was inadequately represented by post-conviction counsel in his first post-
conviction action. Subsequent to the district court's order granting the state's 
motion for summary dismissal based on timeliness and the failure of Banks to 
assert sufficient reason why grounds for relief were not adequately raised in his 
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original post-conviction petition to allow a successive petition (R., pp. 98-102), 
Banks filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment putting forth his general 
complaint that post-conviction counsel failed "to do anything whatsoever" on his 
behalf (R., pp.104-105). 
Banks' argument on appeal is that he was entitled to file a successive 
petition for post-conviction relief because "he has made a substantial factual 
showing that his claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of 
the finding of guilt and could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been 
raised earlier." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) He asserts "the ineffectiveness of his 
attorney at his first post-conviction prevented him from properly presenting his 
arguments." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) The court, however, found in granting the 
state's motion to summarily dismiss Banks' petition for post-conviction as an 
improper successive petition that "the record before the Court shows that 
Petitioner's claims have previously been raised in Petitioner's appeals and prior 
petition for post conviction relief." (R., p.101.) Further, the district court was 
unable to find that Banks had "asserted a sufficient reason for why grounds for 
relief were not adequately raised in the original petition." (R, p.101.) In 
reiterating these findings when denying Banks' motion to alter or amend the 
judgment on post-conviction relief, the court concluded as follows: 
In addition, the Court further finds and concludes that 
Petitioner has failed to make a "substantial factual showing by 
affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief 
raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt 
and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been 
presented earlier." I.C. § 19-4901 (emphasis original). The 
petitioner relies on ineffective assistance of counsel at every stage 
in the proceedings during the last ten (10) years in which he has 
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fervently continued to pursue relief from the judgment as the basis 
for why the Court should grant him relief in the current petition. For 
the reasons herein, that argument is without merit. 
The Court still further finds and concludes that the claims for 
relief asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief in this case 
are claims for relief he had previously raised in the several prior 
proceedings discussed in Section II above, and were fully known to 
him for many years prior to his filing of his post-conviction petition 
in the case on June 18, 2009. 
(R., pp.322-23.) Banks has failed to show otherwise. 
The district court correctly dismissed Banks' petition on the ground that it 
did not meet the statutory requirements for a permissible successive petition 
under I.C. § 19-4908 as the record supports the district court's finding that Banks 
failed to make a substantial factual showing as to the ineffectiveness of his post-
conviction counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Banks' successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 1st day of March 2012. 
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